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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
E N I D COSGRIFF MURPHY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.

vs>

[ 13748

MICHAEL EDWARD MURPHY,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

S T A T E M E N T OF T H E K I N D OF CASE
This is a divorce action.

D I S P O S I T I O N IN T H E L O W E R COURT
The case was tried to the Court. The District
Court awarded Enid Cosgriff Murphy the divorce and
her property that she had brought into the marriage.
The Court awarded Michael Edward Murphy the
sums obtained from the sale of a farm in Minnesota
1
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and directed that Enid Cosgriff Murphy return to
Michael Edward Murphy, without payment, Michael
Edward Murphy's note payable to Enid Cosgriff
Murphy in the amount of $22,500.00 but failed to require Enid Cosgriff Murphy to contribute to or share
in the disastrous financial losses incurred during the
course of the marriage.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Michael Edward Murphy seeks on this appeal,
a) A modification of the trial court's Decree of
Divorce to require Enid Cosgriff Murphy to contribute
equally to the financial losses sustained during the
course of the marriage (based on the evidence received
by the Court), and
b) To remand the case to the District Court with
the requirement that the trial court receive evidence as
to what would be the appreciated value of assets
brought into the marriage by Michael Edward Murphy
in order to determine his actual financial loss during
the course of the marriage, and to require Enid Cosgriff Murphy to contribute equally to this increment
of loss, and
c) To order that the pleadings, i.e. the prayer of
the Complaint, be amended to conform to the evidence
setting forth a demand for an equitable contribution
on the part of Enid Cosgriff Murphy to the financial
losses of the parties.
2
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d) To reverse the trial court and award the Decree of Divorce to Michael Edward Murphy, or in the
alternative, to award him a Decree of Divorce as well
as to Enid Cosgriff Murphy.

I D E N T I F I C A T I O N OF T H E P A R T I E S A N D
E X P L A N A T I O N OF A B B R E V I A T I O N S
Michael Edward Murphy, the Defendant and Appellant, will hereinafter be referred to as the Defendant or where appropriate, by his name. Enid Cosgriff
Murphy, the Plaintiff and Respondent, will hereinafter
be referred to as the Plaintiff, or where appropriate,
by her name.
"R" refers to a page reference in the record of the
case and " T " refers to a page reference in the transcript of the trial case.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Enid Cosgriff Murphy brought an action for divorce against Michael Edward Murphy alleging mental
cruelty (R-1). She initially sought a decree granting
her the divorce (R-2). Subsequently, she also sought
a property settlement granting to each party his respective funds (R-56-60). Michael Edward Murphy
counterclaimed and sought a divorce in his own right
(R-4). At the trial, he urged the Court to require Enid
Cosgriff Murphy to contribute to the financial losses
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he incurred during their marriage (T-103). The disposition in the lower court and the relief sought on
appeal are set forth on pages 1 and 2 of this Brief.
The essential facts are not in dispute. The Defendant Michael Edward Murphy, prior to his marriage
to Enid Cosgriff Murphy in 1964, was a bachelor practicing internal medicine in Salt Lake City (T-82, T150). Enid Cosgriff Murphy was the widow of the
late Walter Cosgriff of Salt Lake City (T-3). At
the time of his marriage to Enid Cosgriff Murphy,
Michael Edward Murphy was residing in his home on
Fortuna Way which he had purchased in May, 1963
(T-81). H e also owned a cottage in Brighton Canyon
which he had built in 1951. In May of 1963 Michael
Edward Murphy inherited a farm in Minnesota consisting of 312 acres (T-81). On January 21, 1964,
Michael Edward Murphy and Enid Cosgriff were
married and commenced living in Michael Edward
Murphy's home on Fortuna Way (T-26). Shortly
after the marriage and in concession to the wishes of
Mrs. Murphy, improvements were made to the Brighton Canyon cottage (T-100). In 1964 and 1965,
prompted by the insistence of Mrs. Murphy, the adjoining lot on Fortuna W a y was purchased (T-105).
Then, in November of 1966, again upon the initiative
of Mrs. Cosgriff, Michael Edward Murphy purchased
acreage adjoining his farm in Minnesota, the adjoining
acreage being known as the Sullivan farm (T-108).
During April or May of 1968, Mrs. Murphy left Dr.
Murphy. In June of that year, the Brighton cottage

4
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was sold in < • d- i \ Inve enough cash to meet the
annual obligations on the F o r t u n a W a y home and the
S-sllivan farm (T-113, T-176, T-177). I n August of
H. Enid Cosgriff M u r p h y commenced a divorce proceeding. I n October of 1968, while the parties were
separated Michael E d w a r d M u r p h y sold the F o r t u n a
W a y home and adjoining h>\ ( T - n : r
Th* purpose
O'f

Oir

:>aV

u;,-,

!o

ill, ' i

'he

i1*t"»K

pnyilKMlt'S

due

Oil

the Sullivan farm and to pay for farm supplies needed
for the past growing season all t o g d h e r totalling
$15,000.00 to $20,000.00 (T-115, T-176, T-177 L Thereafter Michael E d w a r d M u r p h y mo\<d i» ill.- C a u \ o n
Crest Apartments in Salt L a k e fit* . hi December of
1968, the parties reconciled. In J u n e a? T w :°. E n i d
Cosgriff Murphy purchased for Michael E d w a r d
M u r p h y adjoining acreage in Minnesota known as the
"Woodlot" which therefore had been known as the
Naeseth farm, consisting of about 40 acres. D u r i n g
A u g u s t of 1969, the parties moved i ,o Minnesota and
thereafter, encouraged and prodded by E n i d Cosgriff
M u r p l n . v;p•.:• i'* ' Minu an 1 remodeling projects
were undertaken (T-IK». T-129). I n September of
1970, Michael E d w a r d M u r p h y pu'vlm»ed the Cashman farm consisting of 136 acres, (T-170, E x h . loD 1 }.
Again, Enid Cosgriff Murphy was interested in this
acquisition ;unl was influential in its purchase (T-169,
T-170 K l)n-'M.u J u n e and .Inly *»*' !:*'.'' K?;Sd Cosgriff Mmpt: \w »;' 1 Europe with her sister and
brother-in-law for two months (T-122). After her ret u r n in November of 1971, the parties built a manager's
home on t lwi '^••<rinal farm, again upon the insistence of
5
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Mrs. Murphy (T-123). In May of 1972, the parties
separated ( T - l l ) .
A t the time of their marriage, Michael Edward
Murphy had a net worth of $192,000.00 consisting of
cash, his home on Fortuna Way, a cottage in Brighton
Canyon, farm acreage and equipment in Minnesota,
automobiles, a medical practice and other items (R-50).
Mrs. Murphy at that time had a net worth of $1,726,167.56 (Ex. 2D). About one year after the separation
of the parties, Michael Edward Murphy was forced to
sell what had begun as his farm and over which Mrs.
Cosgriff now held equal control (T-178). H e had
assets of $80,516.00 consisting of cash and an automobile and liabilities of $22,500.00 consisting of a note
payable to Enid Cosgriff Murphy which resulted in a
net worth of only $58,010.00. On the other hand, Mrs.
Murphy had an increased net worth of $1,946,961.93
(Ex. 4-D).

POINT I
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D I N NOT REQ U I R I N G E N I D C O S G R I F F M U R P H Y TO
C O N T R I B U T E TO T H E F I N A N C I A L L O S S
SUSTAINED DURING T H E MARRIAGE.
A loss of over $133,000.00 was sustained by Dr.
Murphy during his marriage to Enid Cosgriff (R-50).
The record is clear as to Enid Cosgriff Murphy's involvement in the transactions that lead to that loss
6
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( T - l 76, 17 7" T-> W:\ p-quitr Mrs. Murphy to equally
share in t\ui loss*.:* >u>iam^I v*as an nlujM "f discretion
on the part of *lv f: ml ^nun.
The ]»artie;, were married ^n J a n u a r y 23, 1964
(T-2V V ^<J timr of the marriage, I)r Murphy's
net worth amounted to approximately $192,0^0 **0 < i n sisting of tlv following (R-50) (T-81, 82) :
Item

Value

Cash

$ 15,000,00

E q u i t y in home on
F o r t u n a W a y , Salt I ,akn
City, I Jtali

$ 18,500.00

Brighton Canyon cottage

$ 20,000.00

F a r m and equipment in
Minnesota inherited by
T); A T u rphy free a n -1
i'l<inr «»i encumbrance:, .
r^<» automobiles

- i

,4>| i;u>(HM)0
^

Medical practice in Salt
• L a k e City, I Jtah
Country Club membership
and various securities

is ,000 00

$ iMJMMMJO
:;

•;. MIO.OO

A t the same time, Enid Cosgriff's estate amounted
to $1,748,667.56, consisting of the following (R~48)
(Exhibit 2 - D ) :

7
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Value

Item
Cash

$

3,828.56

Notes receivable with
respect to a golf course

$

42,500.00

Continental Bank & Trust
Company stock

$1,671,695.00

Various other stocks

$

20,644.00

Car, furniture and
other personal effects
(Exhibit 2-D) (R-48)

$

10,000.00

Upon their marriage, the parties lived in Dr.
Murphy's home on Fortuna Way (T-26). Within the
first year of the marriage, the adjoining lot on Fortuna
Way was purchased (T-27, 83) (Exhibits 10-D, 11D ) . The acquisition was made at the suggestion and
insistence of Enid Cosgriff Murphy (T-27). H e r motivation was to build a guest house (T-29). Dr. Murphy
was opposed to the purchase and to the proposed building (T-104). Nevertheless the lot was acquired upon
Mrs. Murphy's insistence and contribution of a small
down payment considering her true financial capacity
with the apparent intention to make yearly payments
(T-105). But after getting him into the deal, she
later refused to meet the yearly obligations thereon
(T-113). The guest house was built as Mrs. Murphy
desired and was connected to the main house by a
bridge and for a time was used as a five-car garage
(T-106) (Ex. 10-D, 11-D).

8
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N e x t ruinr \])t> expansion of the farm operation in
" " inesota. In November of 1966, while the parties
were still living in Salt Lake City, the Sullivan farm
in Minnesota, consisting of approximately 228 acres
ad joining the original farm of D r . Murphy, was purchased ( T - 4 7 ) . Mrs. Cosgriff was the driving force
behind this acquisition (T-108). She paid $15,000.00
as a down payment \\ ilh th<» apparent intention <*f making the yearly payments of $6,000.00 and • *i M! -\\IX *h<farm to D r . Murphy (T-109).
Aftrr separation and initiation of divorce proceedings in UM5H, Mrs Cosgriff told D r . M u r p h y that she
had ii" iiitmli''*; "f making the $6,000.00 annual payment on the Sulln :m fnrm. I n fact, she suggested that
D r . M u r p h y return the farm to M r . Sullivan whom
she stated would be glad to get it back free (T-113).
I n an effort to keep the Minnesota operation D r .
Murphy then made the payments. In dom^ *o h< hud
to liquidate his Salt Lake assets for lb' n; >'drd ,^sh
(T-iTr.V lh- first sold the Brighton cottage I"' S^000.00 ( T-113, 159). Then inasmuch as the annual payments on the Sullivan farm amounted to $6,000.00,
with annual purchases of supplies for the farm running
$15,000.00 to $20,000.00 (T-115) plus being responsible for the payments on the F o r t u n a W a y complex.
D r . Murphy I1 id no alternative but *•> liquids*!* Hie
F o r t u n a W a y properties. I t MJIS dii'fn ult in f;ml a
buyer since the F o r t u n a W a y residence with the substantial additions had become an unusual two-unit complex (T-114). T o piit tb^ property in a saleable form,
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Dr. Murphy converted the complex into two separate
units to be sold separately. In doing so, Dr. Murphy
found it necessary to use all of the money he received
from the sale of the Brighton cottage to cover the remodeling costs (T-114). Money received from the sale
was used to pay the 1969 obligation due on the Sullivan
farm and the required yearly supplies (T-176).
Had it not been for Mrs. Murphy's determination
to purchase the adjoining farm, her default in payment
of the obligations in connection therewith, and the obligation on the Fortuna W a y guest house and lot, Dr.
Murphy would not have had the additional expenses
he incurred nor would he have had to sell the Fortuna
Way property and the Brighton cottage (T-176, 177).
Acting on her own, Mrs. Murphy in 1969 bought
an additional tract of land adjoining the original farm
known as the "Wood lot" or Naeseth farm (T-115)
(Exhibit 15-D). This land was intended as a gift by
Enid Cosgriff Murphy to Dr. Murphy (T-170). She
also had a significant influence in the purchase of the
Cashman property adjoining the Minnesota farm land
(T-170) (Exhibit 15-D) in September, 1969.
Following the various land acquisitions in Minnesota, Mrs. Cosgriff initiated various building projects
—the adding of garages (T-129), the addition of a
TV library in the original home (T-129), and the putting of a manager's home on the original farm (T-122).
The manager's house alone cost $27,500.00 (T-124).
In addition, Mrs. Cosgriff initiated a substantial re-

10
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modeling project on the original inherited farm costing
some $6,500.00 (T-116). She had a particular purpose
in expanding and developing the Minnesota farm. Putting it simply, she apparently wanted nothing less than
a well known farm estate. With the acquisition of the
Sullivan farm, the 40-acre Wood Lot farm (T-115),
the Cashman purchase (T-169, 170), and the manager's
home, she was ready to receive guests at her home-farm
estate (Exhibit 19-D) (T-128). She persuaded Dr.
Murphy to name the entire estate the "Yankee Spy
Farms" complete with stationery (Exhibit 18-D), opening social festival (Exhibit 19-D), and name plates on
farm trucks (Exhibit 16-D). It was Enid Cosgriff
Murphy who initiated the transformation of the farms
and remodeling (T-115). In addition she negotiated
for all of the remodeling work performed for the
Yankee Spy Farms (T-116) (Exhibit 12-D). After
the completion of this project, she entertained often
and lavishly (T-128).
At Dr. Murphy's request, Enid Cosgriff Murphy
maintained the books on the Yankee Spy Farms which
she had created, but after eleven or twelve months (T120) (Exhibit 14-D) lost interest and refused to do
this work. This was the way it usually went — even
with the farm itself. She enthusiastically engaged on
a project involving thousands of dollars—then, after
a while, she lost interest and left a "white elephant" on
Dr. Murphy's hands. It was now his problem to maintain ov dispose of the farm. Neither alternative had
any promise. What she considered a gift or benefit to
11
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Dr. Murphy was in reality an accommodation to her
own taste and nothing but a financial burden to him
(T-176, 177). As a matter of fact, most of the abovementioned acquisitions and remodeling projects were
done without consulting at all with Dr. Murphy (T129) and without his consent (T-96). Irrespective of
whose money was involved, this practice of her obtaining land, building and remodeling without Dr.
Murphy's consent or approval evidences Mrs. Murphy's
determination to have things her own way regardless
of Dr. Murphy's opinion. As a consequence of such
domination and independence, Dr. Murphy not only
suffered financially but suffered emotionally as well.
When Enid Cosgriff Murphy left Dr. Murphy in
1972, just prior to her filing for divorce, she left him
in Minnesota with a huge farm estate which Dr.
Murphy was obligated to maintain and pay for or sell
(T-176). H e had sold his Salt Lake assets to help pay
for this financial burden. In addition, through an absence of four years, he had lost the benefit of his reputation and medical practice he had in Salt Lake City.
When Enid Cosgriff Murphy left Dr. Murphy, he endeavored to sell the farm complex (T-168). H e realized
only $77,000.00 net, from the sale (T-171). This
amount was far less than the value ($113,600.00) of
the farm and equipment he inherited free and clear of
debt (T-178) before his marriage to Enid Cosgriff (R50). Viewing the farm assets alone, Dr. Murphy suffered a loss of $36,600.00. And this loss was attributable
largely to Enid Cosgriff Murphy.
12
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In March of 1973, Dr. Murphy's net worth was
only $58,010.00 (R-50). When he married Enid Cosgriff, his net worth was $192,000.00 (R-50). Financially because of Enid Cosgriff's active participation
in Dr. Murphy's affairs, the marriage resulted in a loss
of $133,990.00.
In MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236
P . 2d 1066 (1951), this Court referred to Pinion v.
Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P . 2d 265, and laid down the
guidelines for making a proper disposition of property.
The first six factors relate to conditions at the time
of the marriage:
1. The social position and standard of living of
each before marriage: Enid Cosgriff was used to a
very high financial and social standard involving lavish
entertaining. Dr. Murphy had a few friends, lived
rather modestly and was quite unaccustomed to the
standard of Mrs. Cosgriff.
2. The respective ages of the parties: H e was 46;
she was as old or older.
3. What each may have given up for the marriage:
Mrs. Cosgriff gave up nothing with respect to wealth.
She even refused to give up her Cosgriff name. Dr.
Murphy furnished a home for the parties on Fortuna
Way, a canyon cottage in Brighton, and the initial
Minnesota farm consisting of 312 acres. In addition,
his entire earnings throughout the marriage were spent
in meeting the ordinary plus the elevated expenditures
Mrs. Cosgriff's style of living demanded.
13
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4. What money or property each brought into the
marriage: Enid Cosgriff brought approximately 1.7
million dollars which she jealously guarded and kept
to herself. Dr. Murphy brought assets into the marriage
valued at $192,000.00 to which both had the use of and
access to during and throughout the marriage.
5. The physical and mental health of the parties:
Both parties were in good health.
6. The relative ability, training and education of
the parties: H e was a medical doctor with a specialty
in internal medicine; she had some experience in the
business field and was conspicuously surrounded by advisors.
The following factors are to be considered at the
time of the divorce:
7. The time and duration of the marriage: 9 years
in this case.
8. The present income of the parties and property
acquired during the marriage and owned either jointly
or by each: See page 7 hereof and R-52, R-14.
9. How the income and property was acquired and
the efforts of each in doing so:
Enid Cosgriff Murphy acquired her income
through the assets she inherited from Walter Cosgriff.
A t the time of the trial, Dr. Murphy's sole income came
from a relatively new medical practice in Nevada (T58). I t is to be noted that he had not been accepted
there with full hospital privileges (T-60). Mrs. Murphy
14
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sustained no financial loss whatsoever during the marriage. Hers was a gain of approximately $200,000.00.
Dr. Murphy's loss was at least $133,990.00.
10. There were no children.
11. The present health of both is good.
12. The present ages are: H e is 55; she is as old
or older.
13. The happiness and pleasure or lack of it experienced during the marriage: There appears to have
been few pleasurable moments, the marriage was
marked with constant difficulty.
14. Any extraordinary sacrifice: There is no evidence of any sacrifice at all by Mrs. Cosgriff. Dr.
Murphy, however, sacrificed greatly in selling his Fortuna Way home, in selling the Brighton cottage, in
assuming the payments, maintenance and operation of
the Minnesota farm complex created by Mrs. Cosgriff,
and by solely absorbing the loss involved in the sale
of the Minnesota farm.
15. The present standard of living and needs of
each including costs of living: Mrs. Cosgriff's estate
at the time of the divorce was approximately 1.9 million (Ex-4-D). Dr. Murphy's was approximately
$58,010.00. He had lost some $133,990.00 during the
course of the marriage. She had gained about $200,000.00.
The trial court gave no consideration to the required guidelines set forth in MacDonald and Pinion.
15
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I t was an abuse of discretion to impose on Dr. Murphy
the total burden of the losses sustained during the marriage. The decision of the trial court is clearly arbitrary
and if allowed to stand would result in manifest injustice. This case is within the parameters of prior
cases where this Court has held that the trial court's
decree was unfair and inequitable under the circumstances.
In Martinette v. Martinette, 8 Ut. 2d 202, 331 P .
2d 821, this Court held that the trial court had abused
its discretion in not awarding the husband more in a
property settlement and modified the trial court's decree. In facts peculiarly similar to the present case,
this Court noted the growing trend of economic independence of women and the impact it was having on
marriages. With that in mind, the court stated:
"It should be kept in mind that the authority
from which orders as to alimony, support money,
and disposition of property is derived is Sec. 303-5, U.C.A. 1953, which provides that when a
divorce decree is entered. 'The court may make
such orders in relation to the . . . property . . .
and the maintenance of the parties . . . as may
be equitable. . . .' It is important to note that
this statute makes no distinction between the
spouses. It does not contemplate, nor should
there be, any discrimination or inequality in such
awards on the basis of sex. They may be made
in favor of either spouse, and should be based
upon the needs of the parties and the equities of
the situation being dealt with.
"[5] This point of view just expressed is significant here because the plaintiff seems to be
16
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the more aggressive of the two; and certainly is
in a better position to fend for herself. Her
steady work and the resulting financial independence indicates that she is partaking of the
general emancipation of women which has been
taking place in various ways in recent years, including their entrance into nearly all fields of
endeavor. The resulting self-reliance and release
from economic dependence upon husbands had
produced its toll in divorces from basically maladjusted and unhappy marriages. Whether this
is good or evil, we are not called upon to say.
It is simply something which we who administer
the law must recognize and deal with under the
law as it exists, but always aware that it must
be constantly adjusting itself to changing conditions and the needs of society. In cases such as
the instant one the ancient idea of the husband
as the pater-familias, or the lord and master, is
outmoded and unrealistic. It is necessary to so
apply the law as to do justice between them on
the basis of a realistic appraisal of their circumstances and the problems each must comfort.

" I t seems to us, that he (the husband) is not
entirely without justification in regarding the
property award as so disproportionate to his
desserts that it is poor reward for his long years
of effort in contributing to its accumulation."
Id. at 824.
The prerogatives of the trial court to distribute the
property of the parties are acknowledged, but this
Court has not hesitated to modify any decree that is
inequitable and indicates an abuse of discretion.
17
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In Be Rose v. Be Rose, 19 Ut. 2d 77, 426 P. 2d
221 (1967), this Court said:
"But this discretion is not without limit, not immune from correction or review if that is warranted. Due to the seriousness of such proceedings and the vital effect they have on people's
lives, it is also the responsibility of this Court to
carefully survey what is done, and while the determinations of the trial court are given deference and not disturbed lightly, changes should be
made if that seems essential to the accomplishment of the desired objectives of the decree;
that is, to make such an arrangement of the
property and economic resources of the parties
that they will have the best possible opportunity
to reconstruct their lives on a happy and useful
basis for themselves and their children. An important consideration in this regard is the elimination or minimization of potential frictions or
difficulties in the future." Id. at page 222.
Dr. Murphy is aware that he should bear his share
of the loss involved and has never requested otherwise.
All he is asking is to be treated equitably. Enid Cosgriff Murphy should be required to share in the disastrous losses sustained during the marriage. The rule
established by this Court in Anderson v. Anderson 18
Ut. 2d 286, 422 P . 2d 192 (1967), seems appropriate.
In that case, this Court affirmed the trial court's decree as to a property settlement, and repected the
wife's contention that certain business debts of the
parties should be paid by the Defendant's husband out
of his earnings and that she should be awarded onehalf of all of the property which would remain after
18
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the payment of such obligations. In rejecting that contention, the court stated:
"It is a novel doctrine that would leave the husband with the accumulated liabilities of 30 years
of married life and award to the wife one-half
of the net assets free and clear of these debts.
Any business venture is accompanied by some
risk of failure and to say that because the husband managed these investments, it is his loss,
but that she nevertheless will share in the profitable portion of his financial endeavors, is an untenable suggestion. She married him for better
or worse. This does not mean the better for her
and the worst for him."
The record clearly indicates that Dr. Murphy suffered a substantial loss because of his marriage to Enid
Cosgriff. His primary assets of his Fortuna Way
home, Brighton cottage and Minnesota farm, lived in,
skied from and vacationed at, which were subject to
modifications had been lost to him because of the manipulation of Mrs. Murphy. Her primary assets of
notes and stocks hidden away in vaults remained intact
and were not used during the marriage.
From the analysis of assets of each party and their
use during the marriage, it is clear that the trial court
abused its discretion in not awarding Dr. Murphy a
more equitable property settlement. This Court should
reverse the trial court and require Enid Cosgriff to
share equally in the losses ($133,990.00) suffered during the marriage, that is, she should be required to contribute (pay to Dr. Murphy) the sum of $66,995.00
19
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plus an additional amount as contended for under
Point I I of this Brief. Dr. Murphy's promissory note
in favor of Enid Cosgriff Murphy in the amount of
$22,500.00 should remain cancelled as ordered by the
trial court with Enid Cosgriff Murphy to have a credit
for that amount leaving a net to be paid of $44,495.00
plus the additional amount as set forth under Point I I
hereof.
POINT II
T H E COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
R E J E C T I N G E V I D E N C E A S TO T H E P R O J E C T E D VALUE OF ASSETS B R O U G H T INTO T H E M A R R I A G E B Y DR. M U R P H Y AS
A BASIS FOR D E T E R M I N I N G H I S R E A L
LOSS.
Dr. Murphy's net worth at the beginning of the
marriage was approximately $192,000.00 (R-50). His
net worth when the parties separated was approximately $58,010.00 (R-50). The difference between
these two figures represents a loss of $133,990.00 (R50). But Dr. Murphy's loss was actually much greater
than $133,990.00. To determine his real loss, it is necessary to consider what he reasonably might be expected
to have had, had it not been for the marriage. His
loss must take into account the appreciation he would
otherwise have realized on assets he had when the marriage began.
The principal involved is simply this: If one were
deprived of a piece of property which five years ago
20
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was worth $10,000.00 but today is worth $20,000,000,
then his loss viewed as today is $20,000.00. By the
same token, if one were deprived of $10,000.00 five
years ago, to be made whole today would not only require the recovery of the $10,000.00 but also interest
on the $10,000.00. In either hypothetical, the actual
loss involves the intial value plus appreciation or interest, as the case may be. So it is with Dr. Murphy.
His loss must take into account the appreciation he
would have realized on assets he had when he entered
into the marriage with Enid Cosgriff Murphy.
On page 7 of this Brief, the initial assets of Dr.
Murphy are itemized. The transactions that followed
in the wake of the marriage and Enid Cosgriff
Murphy's involvement in those transactions are delineated under Point I of this Brief. In short, Dr. Murphy
embarked on the marriage with an established medical
practice (T-82), a home on Fortuna Way (T-83), a
cottage in Brighton (T-99) and the farm in Minnesota
(T-107, 178). With Enid Cosgriffs "help", participation and involvement, he wound up with a "white
elephant" farm in Minnesota (T-176).
Dr. Murphy not only lost the value of the properties he had at the time of the marriage, but he also
lost their appreciated value as of the time the marriage
ended.
The interrogation of Dr. Murphy at the trial of
the case, objections made, the action of the Court with
respect to evidence bearing on the present value of
21
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assets brought into the marriage by D r . M u r p h y and
offers of proof appear on P a g e s 132-149 of the transcript, pertinent extracts being set forth in the Appendix
to this Brief.
H Evidence rejected by the Court would have established that the F o r t u n a W a y property that was sold
for $53,000.00 in 1968 (T-158) would have been worth
$60,000.00 to D r . M u r p h y at the time of the divorce
( T - 1 4 9 ) . Likewise, the Brighton cabin had a value a t
the time of the divorce of approximately $28,000.00 as
contrasted with the $8,000.00 for which it was sold for
in 1968 ( T - 1 5 9 ) .
W i t h respect to the Minnesota farm, D r . M u r p h y
suffered a substantial loss on that sale. W h e n the
parties married, the total net value of the farm, equipment, buildings, and the 312 acres of the original inherited farm in 1964 was $113,600.00. A t the time of
the sale in 1973. D r . M u r p h y received less for the then
716 acres than the 1964 value of his original farm. The
total sale price of the farm equipment, buildings, and
the 716 acres of land was $280,000.00 from which D r .
M u r p h y netted only $77,000.00 (T-171). Evidence rejected by the trial court would have established that the
Minnesota farm property from which D r . M u r p h y
netted $77,000.00 would have been worth $187,200.00
for the 312 original acres at the time of the divorce or
a loss of $110,200.00.
I n sustaining the objection as to materiality and
relevancy, the court erred. The proffered evidence
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would have tended to establish the actual loss. The
values of the property involved at the time of the divorce were not speculative. Furthermore, it can be said
with reasonable certainty that he would have had those
properties had it not been for his marriage to Mrs.
Cosgriff and what happened during the course of the
marriage. The weight of the evidence would have been
a matter for the court to have considered, but certainly
it should not have been rejected as being speculative.
The claim for contribution is one of the major
claims of this action. The facts tending to prove the
loss suffered and the value of the loss to Dr. Murphy
are therefore material to this claim. Evidence establishing a material fact is relevant and should be admitted, Simpson v. General Motor Corp., 24 Ut. 2d
301, 470 P . 2d 399 (1970). Furthermore, the valuation
of property awarded in a divorce case is a material and
ultimate fact, Wold V. Wold, 7 Wash. App. 872, 50 3
P . 2d 118 (1972). McCormick states that the most acceptable test of relevancy is the question "Does the
evidence offered render the desired inference more probable than it would be without the evidence?", McCormic on Evidence, p. 437. With respect to divorce actions, even greater liberalities should be extended to
the admission of testimony than in litigation generally,
Bursa v. Bursa, 78 Ohio L. Abs. 498, 150 N.E.2d 306
(1958) Under these tests, it is clear that the offered
evidence was relevant in that it related to Dr. Murphy's
true loss.
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Not only was the offered evidence relevant, but
Dr. Murphy was a proper witness to be asked these
questions. The information was solely within his knowledge. The testimony sought would have intended to
establish the element of a claim for contribution to
losses sustained during and because of the marriage.
H e was not asked to testify as to the value of the loss
sustained, but only as to whether, but for his marriage
to Enid Cosgriff, he would have sold the various properties. Such testimony is relevant to the issue of his
loss.
With respect to the opinion of Dr. Murphy as to
the value of his land, it is a well-established rule of
law in Utah that an owner of real property is a proper
witness to testify as to his opinion of the value of his
land, Provo Rive?9 Water Users v. Carson, 133 P . 2d
777; State v. Dillree, 25 Ut. 2d 184, 478 P . 2d 507.
An owner may also testify as to the value of the improvements on land. A general statement of this proposition is found in 32 C.J.S. 546 (120), P . 472; See
also Mother v. Lack, 41 Cal. App. 23, 181 P . 813. The
witness was therefore qualified to give his opinion. If
the Court had received the same, it would have tended
to establish the true loss sustained to Dr. Murphy. Accordingly, on this ground, the case should be reversed
and remanded to the trial court to hear evidence that
it rejected and in the light thereof evaluate the true
loss as sustained by Dr. Murphy.
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POINT III
T H E COURT E R R E D IN D E N Y I N G
M I C H A E L E D W A R D MURPHY'S MOTION
TO A M E N D T H E P R A Y E R O F H I S COUNT E R C L A I M TO S E E K E Q U I T A B L E CONT R I B U T I O N TO T H E F I N A N C I A L L O S S
S U S T A I N E D D U R I N G T H E COURSE OF
T H E MARRIAGE.
During the course of the trial, counsel for the Defendant moved the Court to amend the prayer of the
Counterclaim to request that Enid Cosgriff Murphy
contribute an amount equal to one-half of the overall
loss sustained during the course of the marriage (T103). The court denied the Motion (T-103). The Motion was prompted by Plaintiff's objection to testimony the Defendant was seeking to elicit (T-102). The
Defendant had already introduced evidence of Mrs.
Cosgriff's involvement in various land purchases and
developments showing the relationship between her
actions and losses sustained (T-27, 90-91, 99). Counsel for Mrs. Murphy objected to questions which would
have elicited further evidence going to those losses (T102). The basis for Plaintiff's objection was that the
evidence being sought was at variance with the prayer
of the Counterclaim and not justified under the rules
(T-102).
This Court will note that the Counterclaim (R-4)
requested that because of Mrs. Cosgriff's action she
be required to make certain payments and also sought
25
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"such other and further relief as the Court may deem
proper" (R-6).
Inasmuch as the status of the property had changed
following the date of the filing of the Counterclaim
(R-59) and to remove any question as to the scope of
the prayer of the Counterclaim, counsel for the Defendant moved the Court to amend to specifically demand that Mrs. Murphy contribute an amount equal
to one-half of the overall loss sustained during the
course of the marriage (T-103).
The Defendant contends that the prayer of his
Counterclaim was already sufficiently broad to allow
the trial court to require Mrs. Murphy to contribute to
one-half of the loss sustained. However, in view of the
trial court's denial of the Motion to Amend and in view
of the court's failure to require Mrs. Murphy to contribute to the loss sustained, the trial court's ruling on
the Motion to Amend the Prayer of the Complaint becomes most significant.
It is now unclear whether or not the trial court's
refusal to require any financial contribution on the part
of Mrs. Cosgriff was prompted by the equities of the
case or what the court considered a too restrictive
Counterclaim demand which the court was unwilling to
amend.
If the prayer of the Complaint was already sufficiently broad, then the amendment, though technically
unnecessary, would have removed any question and
would have been harmless. On the other hand, if the
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prayer of the Counterclaim needed to be more specific,
then it was a flagrant abuse of discretion to deny the
amendment and create a technical basis for doing less
than equity requires in the case.
It is the Defendant's position that the prayer of
the Counterclaim was sufficient and that the Court
could well have required contribution. However, as
indicated, having made the Motion to Amend which
was denied there arises an uncertainty as to the relationship of that denial and the unwillingness of the
Court to require a contribution by Mrs. Murphy to
the financial losses sustained.
Certainly the question of whether or not Enid Cosgriff Murphy should contribute to the losses sustained
ought not to turn on any technical question of whether
or not the prayer of the Counterclaim was sufficiently
broad. In view of our rules of civil procedure allowing amendment, no trial court ought to deny a Motion
to Amend a Counterclaim in circumstances such as
those in the instant case—and certainly not as a technical basis for precluding a contribution. The question
of whether or not Mrs. Murphy ought to contribute to
the losses sustained ought to turn on the existing
equities which demand that she should.
It is a well-established rule of law that when evidence has been introduced with respect to a material
fact in question, an amendment to conform to such proof
is appropriate, 71 C.J.S. 285, P . 612; recognized in
Utah, Newton v. Tracy Loan § Trust Co., 88 Utah 547,
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40 P . 2d 204; In Re: Bundy's Estate, 21 Utah 299, 241
P . 2d 462. Furthermore, Rule 15 (b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure was an ample basis for allowing the amendment.
In addition, the Motion to Amend neither constituted a variance with the original Counterclaim nor
was it a wholly different cause of action. I t was only
made as a means of amplification and elaboration of
matters stated in the original Counterclaim. Amendments sought to clarify a cause of action of an original
pleading and which are germane thereto, have been
held by this court to not constitute new matters and
not at variance with the original pleadings, Crane v.
Crane, 102 Utah 411, 131 P.2d 1022; Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135
P.2d 919; Graham v. Street, 109 Utah 460, 166 P.2d
524. The rule established in Wells v. Wells, 2 U. 2d
241, 272 P.2d 167 is particularly in point.
". . . the test is not whether under technical rules
of pleading a new cause of action is introduced,
but rather the test is whether a wholly different
cause of action or legal obligation is introduced;
that is, an amendment will be allowed if a change
is not made in the liability sought to be enforced
against the defendant." Id. at 170.
In this case, no "wholly different cause of action"
or "legal obligation" was introduced, nor was a change
made in the liability sought to be enforced against Mrs.
Murphy in the amended Counterclaim. The original
pleadings contemplated contribution and the amend28
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ment merely amplified and more clearly defined what
the original counterclaim intended.
This Court should hold that the prayer of the Complaint seeking "such other and further relief as the
Court may deem proper," is sufficient to require Enid
Cosgriff Murphy to contribute to one-half of the losses
sustained during the marriage. If this Court should
hold that such a prayer for relief is not sufficient to
require Enid Cosgriff Murphy to contribute to onehalf of the losses sustained, then the trial court should
be reversed and the defendant's Motion to Amend allowed to the end that the matter of contribution to the
losses sustained will turn on the equities involved and
not on the technical form of a prayer for relief.
P O I N T IV
T H E COURT COMMITTED ERROR
NOT A W A R D I N G T H E D E C R E E OF
VORCE TO DR. M I C H A E L M U R P H Y OR
LEAST GRANTING H I M A DIVORCE
W E L L AS TO E N I D C O S G R I F F .

IN
DIAT
AS

The Court's attention is invited to the testimony
of Enid Cosgriff Murphy with respect to her alleged
grounds for divorce found on pages 3 through 15 of
the record. In vague, general terms, lacking in specificity, gravity and recency, she referred to Dr. Murphy's
"criticisms" (T-7). Indeed her testimony, for the more
part, amounts to nothing more than her own conclusions.
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I t should be pointed out that the parties separated from September to December in 1968 (T-9).
With much of her testimony with respect to grounds,
there is no indication whether what Enid Cosgriff
Murphy was complaining about was before or after
they separated.
She complained that following the reconciliation
some portion of his prior conduct began again (T-10).
but there is nothing to indicate exactly what it was or
when it took place (T-10). She testified that, "those
actions and statements and attitudes" continued in late
March, April or May of 1972, but this vague conclusion is totally lacking in specificity as to what "actions,"
what "statements," and what "attitudes" were involved
(T-ll).
Mrs. Murphy complained of Dr. Murphy's being
critical of certain "fiction" which Dr. Murphy allegedly
referred to as "Enid's trash" (T-12), but there is nothing to indicate specifically what happened, what was
involved, or whether it occurred before or after the
parties reconciled. As far as this record is concerned,
there is nothing to show that any criticism of Mrs.
Murphy's reading occurred following the reconciliation.
There is also some general complaint that Dr.
Murphy "criticized" her "loyalty to the business advisors who might have inherited along with the property
from Walter Cosgriff with a blind loyalty and that I
didn't analyze them. . . ." (T-13). This all appears
to have taken place prior to the reconciliation.
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Then counsel for Enid Cosgriff Murphy finally
asked, "Now tell us, if you will, what effect this conduct that you have mentioned by the Defendant, what
effect did that have on you?" There is no indication
in the record of what conduct was being referred to
(T-13).
Apparently the event that caused Mrs. Murphy
to leave Dr. Murphy was an episode involving a water
heater (T-11, 12, 14). There is no indication of what
Dr. Murphy did. All Mrs. Murphy states is the he
created a "very bad scene over the malfunction of the
water heater" (T-12) or "created a scene" (T-14). It
is the court's function and not Mrs. Murphy's to draw
conclusions.
General assertions of misconduct in the absence of
direct proof are of insufficient probitive value to warrent a divorce for mental cruelty. A general statement
of this proposition of law is found in 27A C.J.S. 143
(3)e, P . 527. This court adhered to this general principle in Hyrup v. Hyrup, 66 Utah 580, 245 P . 335
where it told that:
"Courts are not authorized to grant divorces except for the particular causes prescribed by law,
and then only when the grounds or cause for divorce is proved by substantial and satisfactory
evidence."
Mrs. Murphy's testimony is simply insufficient to sustain a Decree of Divorce in her favor.
The real problem in this marriage was that of
which Dr. Murphy complained (R-5). From the out31
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set Mrs. Murphy was neither committed to the marriage nor to Dr. Murphy (T-72). Mrs. Murphy was
wrapped up in the preservation and perpetuation of
the Cosgriff name, fame and fortune. The background
of what happened following Mr. Cosgriff's death and
continuing after Enid Cosgriff's marriage to Dr.
Murphy is reflected in her own testimony (T-15, 20)
and Dr. Murphy's testimony (T-68).
Enid Cosgriff Murphy admitted on cross-examination that she may have told Dr. Murphy, prior to
the marriage, that she was fatigued and intended to
completely retire from public service and public life
after ". . . completion of the baseball venture" (T-22),
but this she did not do. What Enid Cosgriff did after
the marriage constituted ample grounds for divorce in
favor of Dr. Murphy. Mrs. Cosgriff was never really
Dr. Murphy's wife. As a matter of fact, she constantly
preferred being referred to as Mrs. Enid Cosgriff
rather than Mrs. Murphy. She admitted that she continued using the name Cosgriff well after her marriage
to Dr. Murphy (T-16). The reason that she gave was
that the name "Cosgriff" had become well known
throughout Utah. She implied that it was necessary to
keep the name in order to keep the sports contacts
necessary for the operation of the Salt Lake Bees Baseball team with which she had become affiliated (T-16).
But her involvement terminated shortly after she married Dr. Murphy (T-16). However, rather than give
up the name Cosgriff and assume the name Murphy
for all purposes, she persisted in the continued use of
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the Cosgriff name (T-18). This had an obvious demoralizing effect on Dr. Murphy (T-79). H e felt that
he was losing his own personality (T-79). Dr. Murphy
assumed at the outset of the marriage that Enid Cosgriff would assume the Murphy name and be his wife
(T-70).
Even after they moved to Minnesota where the
Cosgriff name had no significance whatsoever, Mrs.
Murphy persisted in using the Cosgriff name (T-71,
72). There is nothing to refute Dr. Murphy's testimony that throughout his marriage, he felt he was never
married to Mrs. Cosgriff. She remained Mrs. Walter
Cosgriff from the day he married her until the day she
left(T-96).
Typical of Mrs. Murphy's obsession with the Cosgriff name, fame and fortune was the "golf shrine"
[ocated at a residence of Mrs. Murphy kept at 401 11th
Avenue (T-29) (Exhibits 6-P, 7-P, 8-D). On their
seventh anniversary in 1971, a party was given by Mrs.
Cosgriff at the 11th Avenue home (T-91). Some 150
people were present (T-91). Located in a conspicuous
iisplay was a golf shrine exhibiting the golf trophies
3f her former husband, Walter Cosgriff (Exhibits 7-P
and 8-D). During the course of the party, many of the
quests passed by the schrine with statements being made
to Dr. Murphy such as: "Michael, rather than marriage, this is an imitation. Why aren't some of your
ski trophies in this display?" (T-92). It is obvious that
the golf shrine had a demoralizing effect on Dr.
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Murphy and tended to relegate him to something less
than a husband of Mrs. Cosgriff.
Mrs. Cosgriff was often critical of Dr. Murphy's
family. On one particular occasion, Mrs. Cosgriff told
Dr. Murphy's sister-in-law who was staying with the
Murphy's in Minnesota that the sister-in-law was destroying the evening and that it was impossible to carry
on a conversation with her (T-76). Dr. Murphy's
family refused to come again after this incident. On
another occasion in front of Dr. Murphy's two neices,
Mrs. Cosgriff stormed out of the house while they were
having a discussion with Dr. Murphy and Mrs. Cosgriff (T-77). On another occasion in Minnesota, in
approximately January of 1972, Dr. Murphy and Mrs.
Cosgriff had given several parties and after one particular party, Mrs. Cosgriff carried on by screaming,
shouting, slamming doors and stamping her feet, all of
which Dr. Murphy was not prepared for and caused
him great anxiety (T-79).
Mrs. Cosgriff never consulted Dr. Murphy about
financial matters. She would always discuss these matters with her attorneys and would never involve Dr.
Murphy. As a result, Dr. Murphy felt more of an adversary to her and her lawyers than he did a husband
(T-96, 97). This process of consulting attorneys without Dr. Murphy's knowledge continued even after the
parties moved to Minnesota (T-97).
Mrs. Cosgriff also took extended trips abroad
without Dr. Murphy. After persuading Dr. Murphy
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to move to Minnesota, Mrs. Murphy told Dr. Murphy
that she did not intend to stay there (T-74). She described Minnesota as a dreadful place and promptly
left for Europe with her sister and brother-in-law (T74). Dr. Murphy was then alone to run the farm Mrs.
Murphy had moved him on to without any assistance
from her.
The right of a husband to have a Decree of Divorce is well established, Section 30-3-2, Utah Code
Annotated (1953). Older case law has held that in
order for the husband to secure a divorce on the grounds
o{ mental cruelty, aggravated grounds must be shown,
Doe v. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 Pac. 781; Schuster v.
Schuster, 88 Utah 257, 53 P . 2d 428. The reason given
for this in Alldredge v. Alldredge, 119 Ut. 2d 504, 229
P. 2d 681, was that:
"The woman is more sensitive than the man and
that she is not so much inured to life's buffetings; hence, that acts and conduct on the part of
a husband may well constitute cruelty to the
wife, causing her great mental distress when
similar acts and conduct on her part may not
constitute cruelty to him or cause him great mental distress." Id.'at 663
However, the court implied that this rule may not
be applicable, "in this non-chivalrous age of economic
equality of the sexes and the wife's emergence from the
home into the business and professional realms." Id.
at 663. In that case, the court upheld the Decree of
Divorce in the husband's favor in view of the wife's
conduct in allowing numerous parties in the home. It
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should be noted that the standard of allowing the wife
a divorce for mental cruelty on less provocation than
the husband has been modified elsewhere where facts
present a stronger case for the husband, Woolley v.
Woolley, 113 Utah 391,195 P.2d 743.
The present case involves facts that fall within the
language of Alldredge, supra. Mrs. Cosgriff is a financially independent person. Her wealth had made her
very independent of Dr. Murphy. The rule of requiring the husband to adduce evidence showing aggravated
mental cruelty as Doe and Schuster, supra, is plainly
not applicable here. She was used to the buffetings of
life and was emotionally equipped to meet them. Under
this theory, the evidence she produced of mental cruelty
by Dr. Murphy is insufficient.
Under the established law of this State, Dr.
Murphy's assertions of mental cruelty have been substantiated. The evidence was ample to allow the court
to grant the divorce to Dr. Murphy. This Court has
held that where the husband has established facts indicating mental cruelty by the wife, the husband should
be awarded the divorce, Griffiths v. Griffiths, 3 Ut.
2d 82 278 P.2d 983 (1955). In that case, evidence indicated that the wife constantly nagged the husband
causing frequent separations between them, not unlike
the present case.
If the Court believes Mrs. Cosgriff has established
sufficient evidence establishing mental cruelty, then
this court should award the divorce to both parties.
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This rule of granting each the divorce is well estabished in the Utah law. In Sartain v. Sartain, 15 Ut. 2d
98, 389 P . 2d 1023 (1964), Justice Henriod in a concurring opinion stated:
"From the record, I cannot see where the defendant was pearly white and plaintiff only
pearly gray-white or where plaintiff shouted too
loudly but defendant less audibly. I believe this
is a case where each and both parties should have
been granted a divorce, in that the Hendricks case
should be tempered where the acts of cruelty approach a clash in the middle of the domestic
spectroscope. I think the case well might have
been resolved by granting to each of the litigants
a divorce, which might be helpful, but hardly
harmful to anyone that this issue was not urged
on appeal." Id. at 1023.
This Court has also reiterated this rule in Mullins v.
lullins, 26 Ut. 2d 82, 485 P . 2d 663 (1971) where
Jection 30-3-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953) was inerpreted. This Court held that the trial court was in
rror in not awarding both sides a Decree of Divorce
fhere both were equally at fault.
Accordingly, on the record of this case, it was Dr.
lurphy who had grounds for divorce and not Enid
"osgriff Murphy. It was an abuse of discretion for
tie trial court to award the Decree of Divorce to Mrs.
lurphy and ignore Dr. Murphy's grounds. And even
?
this court holds that Mrs. Murphy's "grounds" were
dequate, then it should award a Decree of Divorce to
)r. Murphy also under the established law of this State
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as noted above or remanded the case to the trial court
with directions to also grant Dr. Murphy a Decree of
Divorce.

CONCLUSION
The decision of the trial court should be reversed
and Enid Cosgriff Murphy should be required to contribute an amount equal to one-half of the losses sustained (based on evidence received by the Court) by
paying to Dr. Murphy the sum of $44,495.00, the same
being one-half of the total loss sustained. This is in
accordance with the argument under Point I hereof
and gives credit for the cancelled Promissory Note.
In addition, the true loss sustained by Dr. Murphy
should be determined and accordingly, the case should
be remanded to the trial court to receive additional
evidence on the present value of assets initially brought
into the marriage by Dr. Murphy as a base for determining his real loss as urged in Point I I hereof. That
is, on remand to the trial court, current values must be
determined of assets initially owned by Dr. Murphy,
which assets he would reasonably been expected to own
at the time of the divorce except for his marriage to
Enid Cosgriff. The difference between his initial net
worth and ending net worth (taking into account the
appreciated value of assets initially owned) represents
his true loss and the Court should have received evidence of the same.
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Consistent with the argument under Point I I I , this
ourt should rule that the prayer for relief in the Counerclaim seeking "such other and further relief as the
ourt may deem proper," is sufficiently broad to reuire a contribution to losses on the part of Enid Cos;riff Murphy. If this Court rules otherwise, then this
"ourt should reverse the trial court and its denial of
he amendment moved for and allow the amendment to
he prayer of the Counterclaim to specifically require
contribution to losses.
In addition, as argued under Point IV hereof, this
"ourt should reverse the trial court and hold that Enid
"osgrif f Murphy has not sustained her burden of provig grounds for divorce and accordingly, this Court
hould award the divorce to Dr. Murphy. In the event
his Court holds that the evidence is sufficient to susain the trial court's award of a Decree of Divorce to
Cnid Cosgriff Murphy, then this Court should also
ward a Decree of Divorce to Dr. Murphy or in the
lternative, remand the case to the trial court with
irections to the trial court to enter a Decree of Diorce in his favor as well as to Mrs. Murphy.
As this Court eloquently stated in the divorce acion of Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Ut. 2d 286, 422 P .
d192, 194:
"Any business venture is accompanied by some
risk of failure and to say that because a husband
managed these investments, it is his loss but that
she will nevertheless share in the profitable portion of his financial endeavors, is an untenable
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suggestion. She married him for 'better or worse'
This does not mean the 'better' for her and the
c
worse' for him J" (emphasis added)
The instant case is even stronger than the Anderson case, where in the instant case the record shows
that Enid Cosgriff Murphy was the real driving force
and "manager" that led to the disastrous losses incurred.
Respectfully submitted.
McKAY, B U R T O N , M c M U R R A Y & T H U R M A N
By
Macoy A. McMurray
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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APPENDIX
The interrogation of Dr. Murphy at the trial of
le case, objections made, the action of the Court with
jspect to the evidence bearing on the present value of
le assets brought into the marriage by Dr. Murphy
ad offers of proof are as follows:
(T-132) MR. M c M U R R A Y : . . . What value do
you place on that, or did you place on that initial farm at the time of your separation when
you owned the property?
MR. S N O W : Object
material and irrelevant.

this as completely im-

(T-139) T H E C O U R T : W e l l I think the way
the question was phrased, that it is objectionable.

MR. M c M U R R A Y : I have in mind, Dr.
Murphy, the 312 acres which you inherited. I
have in mind the improvements which were on
the property when you entered into this marriage.. I have in mind any maintenance that
might have been done. Obviously, you kept it
up. I understand that. Now, if there were additional items purchased additional improvements
made, and I thing you have testified there may
have been some; I'm not asking that. You can
exclude those. That would reduce any figure
that you can exclude those. That would reduce
any figure that you would have in mind. I have
in mind simply what you started out with as to
that initial acreage with the improvements that
were then on it as they had been maintained up
to the time you sold it, and I want you to tell
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the Court what you valued it at, or would value
it at as an owner.
(T-140) MR. S N O W : Objection. There's still
no foundation for that.
T H E C O U R T : The objection will be sustained.
*

*

*

(T-140) MR. M c M U R R A Y : Comes now the
defendant in this case by and through his attorney and makes this offer of proof with respect to the matter which there has just been
some discussion about. May the record show that
if Dr. Murphy were permitted to testify on this
matter, he would do so as an owner of the property that he is being interrogated about, that is,
he owned it at the time that I am asking him to
give a value, and that his testimony would be
that a fair value for the property would be
$600.00 per acre; that the $600.00 per acre would
be a figure which would cover the home that was
initially there and the improvements that were
initially there as they have been maintained over
the period of time up until the time that Mrs.
Cosgriff left, and that that $600.00 per acre
would exclude additional improvements that
might have been made and were made, or any
other buildings or expansion projects which were
not a part of the acreage when he entered into
the marriage, and that accordingly, the value of
the farm acreage at that time that I am inquiring about would be according to my calculations
$600.00 per acre for 312 acres, for a total of
$187,200.00 as representing Dr. Murphy's opinion as to the value of the property at the time
indicated.
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(T-145) MR .McMURRAY: Now, Dr. Murphy,
if you had not married Enid Cosgriff, can you
state with reasonable certainty whether or not
you would have continued your medical practice
here in Salt Lake City?
MR. S N O W : Objection. Objected to as immaterial and irrelevant. They did get married,
and he was a grown man at the time.
T H E C O U R T : Sustained.
*

*

#

(T-145) MR. M c M U R R A Y : The defendant acting by and through his counsel now makes this
offer of proof, that had it not been for the marriage to Enid Cosgriff, that he would state with
reasonable probability that there was nothing
that would indicate that he should leave this area,
that he would still be practicing medicine in his
field of specialty here in Salt Lake City.
(T-145) MR. M c M U R R A Y : Dr. Murphy, can
you state with reasonable certainty if it hadn't
have been for your marriage to Enid Cosgriff
whether or not you would still be owing the basic
acreage which you inherited in Minnesota, the
312 acres, the Brighton property that you had
described, the cottage, the canyon property, and
the house on Fortuna Way ?
MR. S N O W : Objection. Objected to, Your
Honor, for the reasons previously stated, and
also because it's pure speculation. It's totally
irrelevant and immaterial to the issues in this
case.
T H E C O U R T : Sustained.
(T-146) MR. M c M U R R A Y : The defendant by
and through his counsel makes this offer of
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proof, and if permitted to testify, the defendant
would testify in substance that were it not for
the marriage to Enid Cosgriff that he believes
with reasonable probability that he would still
own the basic acreage that he had inherited in
Minnesota, the 312 acres, that it is doubtful that
he would have acquired any other additional
acreage surrounding it, that he would still have
the canyon property in Brighton, and that he
would still have the home and residence on Fortuna Way.
*

*

*

(T-148) MR. M c M U R R A Y : May the record
show that we have had a discussion in chambers,
and that I have considered with the Court and
with counsel the calling of Mr. Sterling Webber,
who I will represent to the Court is a qualified
real estate appraiser, and have indicated to the
Court my desire to call him to testify as to the
present values of the home on Fortuna Way and
the present value of the Brighton cabin property,
which would include the acreage and the cabin,
and that I understand that there would be an
objection made to my calling — an objection
made on the part of Mr. Snow to his so testifying, and I understand that the Court would sustain that objection, and I would, therefore, proceed with an offer of proof, if that correctly
represents our understanding.
*

*

*

(T-148) MR. M c M U R R A Y : The defendant. Dr.
Michael E . Murphy, acting by and through his
counsel, makes this offer of proof, that if Mr.
Sterling Webber were called and permitted to
testify, that he would testify first as to his qualifications as a real estate appraiser in our area,
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that he would testify extensively as to those qualifications, and that he had gone to the home on
Fortuna Way which has been identified in this
proceeding which was the home that was occupied by Dr. Murphy at the time that he married
Enid Cosgriff; that he would testify as to his
appraisal of the property, his evaluation, his going upon it, and that he has made a thorough
appraisal report, and that the value of the property today would be $64,800.00, provided, however, that there is a kitchen improvement in the
property of $4,000.00, which was made by the
subsequent owner and/or occupant of the property, which was not made, of course, by Dr.
Murphy; and therefore, the value of the lot and
the home as Dr. Murphy occupied it on today's
market would be $60,800.00. Is that correct?
$60,800.00. With respect to the Brighton cabin
property, if Mr. Webber were permitted to testify, he would testify that he did go, that he has
gone to the cabin property, appraised it, and
that in his opinion the fair market value of the
Brighton cabin property as identified in this proceeding, and which Dr. Murphy owned at the
time he entered into this marriage with Enid
Cosgriff, that was subsequently sold, that its'
value today would be $28,000.00; that the property would actually have a value of $31,000.00,
except for the impact of an existing zoning ordinance which he feels has diminished that value
by $4,000.00 leaving a value of that property on
today's market at $28,000.00. That would be
sufficient on that offer of proof, Your Honor.
(T-149) T H E C O U R T : I suppose you have an
objection to that testimony being offered?
MR. S N O W : I would object to it, that the
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present value of that property would be totally
irrelevant, immaterial, and outside the issues of
this ease.
T H E C O U R T : Your objection will be sustained. Do you have other questions of the doctor?
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